The EU-China Political Relationship

The EU has had formal relations with China since 1975. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these relations have tended to focus on economic affairs in general, and trade issues in particular. But what both sides call the ‘Strategic Partnership’ (战略合作) includes cooperation on security, the environment and global governance, as well as economic affairs. Of course it is difficult to separate economics from politics in any bilateral relationship, and in many respects, the EU-China political relationship remains heavily influenced by economic relations.

Human rights have arguably been the most sensitive area of the EU-China relationship. The EU is committed to promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights in its international interactions (and not just with China). A resolution condemning China came within one vote of being adopted at the UN Human Rights Commission in 1995, and the European Parliament continues to be a forum where Chinese rights related issues are debated. But 1995 also saw the creation of a formal EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and, since then, the desire to promote change has been moderated by an understanding that it is better to engage China through discussion and dialogue than try to force change through coercion and pressure.

The human rights issue is linked to a second sensitive topic in the form of the arms embargo that has been placed on China since 1989. Jacques Chirac’s apparent desire to lift the embargo in 2005 came to nothing, leading to Chinese criticism if the EU’s autonomy as an international relations actor – partly due to internal policy divisions within the EU and partly due to pressure from Washington for the EU to conform to its policy. The issue has still not gone away and the EU remains divided over whether or not to lift the embargo.

Environmental issues are also a key area of EU-China joint interest and bilateral interaction. The EU has supported a number of projects in China aimed at improving environmental governance and introducing best practice and technological advances. But Europe and China have not been able to reconcile their positions on key issues related to global environmental change. For example, developed-developing world divisions over governance of the global commons played at least some role in the relative failure of the Copenhagen summit.

These differing perceptions also impact initiatives to change the balance of power in global institutions, and perhaps even some of the norms and principles that underpin them. The reform of international institutions to reflect the growing significance of rising powers – not just China – has been widely accepted; there has even been some readjustment of voting power at the International Monetary Fund. But finding an agreed balance between existing and new powers remains a work in progress. Notably, there is a key difference in the importance of EU-China relations in those institutions where the EU plays a key role (such as the World Trade Organization) and those where individual European states are the key actors (such as the UN Security Council).

Finally, while there was a period when discussions regarding development assistance between China and the EU were devoted to European assistance to China, this has now diversified. With China’s increased contact with Africa and Latin America, and its ever increasing interest in “south-south” cooperation, attention is now turning to the developmental side of China’s growing global profile. For some, the rise of China challenges the promotion of a global liberal order, while for others, it marks the potential for effective development cooperation between Europe and China. As a relatively new agenda item, both the implications of China’s engagement with the developing world and the prospects for EU-China collaboration remain somewhat unclear – but both are likely to be of increasing importance in future years.

In thinking about the political relationship between the EU and China, a number of key challenges stand out - some relate to the bilateral relationship, and some to the nature of the EU as an international relations actor. We can perhaps summarise them as follows:

* The relationship between economic opportunities arising from dealing with China on the one hand, and the desire to promote human rights, the rule of law and democracy on the other. While the emphasis has traditionally focussed on the benefits of trading with and investing in China, European financial problems have now added a new level of complexity. It is now desirable to encourage and accept significant Chinese investment into the EU.

* How best to promote political and social change within China – the balance between pressure, dialogue, consultation, economic engagement, capacity building and partnership. Can external actors influence domestic change within China?

*Is the EU an effective international actor? What is the balance within Europe – for example, between the Parliament and the Commission, but also between the EU as a whole and individual European states that are pursing their own policies towards China? Which level of authority is the most effective at dealing with China: the EU level, the national level, the sub-national level, the NGO level or the individual/private sector level?

* The relationship between the EU and other Western powers - particularly, but not only, the USA. Is it best, or even possible, to try and find a common position in dealing with China or will divisions within the West make this impossible, for example, global environmental issues. 

*How best can Europe understand Chinese interests and objectives – and how best can Europe articulate its own interests and objectives to China?

Shaun Breslin, ECRAN Key Expert in Politics                          August 2011